Introduction
The sovereignty disputes over the Paracels (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese/Xisha in Chinese) solutions. 6 Several reasons have been put forward to explain the complexity of the SCS disputes: the geostrategic location of the SCS; the territorial disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys and maritime areas in the SCS; the competition for control over natural resources in the area; the lack of clarity of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( "UNCLOS" ) on the status of islands and rocks, and national sentiments.
To understand the situation, new research on the positions of claimants in light of new developments of international law and practices is necessary. This article does not attempt to give a comprehensive study of the position of all claimants and concerned parties. Nor has it any ambition to analyze all developments of international law which may impact the competition for sovereignty and maritime rights in the SCS. Vietnam is one of the claimants which has been the most affected by the SCS conflict. Thus, this article only addresses the Vietnamese position on the sovereignty disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys and maritime zones in the SCS. The Vietnamese position will be examined from three aspects: (1) the sovereignty of the Paracels and the Spratlys; (2) the maritime zones around these islands; and (3) the settlement of disputes in the SCS.
Vietnamese Position on the Sovereignty of the Paracels and Spratlys
The Paracels are an archipelago consisting of over 30 islands, islets, and reefs stretching over some 16,000 square kilometres of the ocean surface between North latitude 16。and 17。 and East longitude 111。and 113。 . The Spratlys cover an ocean space ten times bigger than Paracels, between 160,000 and 180,000 square kilometres, with more than 100 islands, islets, and reefs between North latitude 12。and 4。and East longitude 109。 and 118。 . The two groups of islands also have a large number of banks and shoals. The distances from the Paracels to the nearest points on the Vietnamese mainland (Da Nang port) and China' s Hainan Island are 170 and 160 nautical miles ( "nm" ), respectively. In the case of the Spratlys, the distances are 250 nm to Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam) and and 520 nm to Chinese Hainan Island. 7 For a long time, those tiny features were only known as extremely dangerous sites for navigators or shelters for fishermen in the region. 8 In the early seventeenth century, the Vietnamese dynasties (Nguyen Lords and Kings, and Tay Son Rulers and Kings) were the first ones to exercise State functions over these uninhabited and distant islands. The first wave of permanent occupation of those uninhabited and resource-poor islets without fresh water occurred in the 1920s-1930s when France, which had represented the Vietnamese Kingdom in foreign affairs since 1884, sent permanent troops to the Paracels and the Spratlys. 
A. Before the Twentieth Century
During the settlement of sovereignty disputes between States, the "principle of effectiveness"was formulated, and continues to be recognized under international law, treaties, customs, and international adjudications. ) also stressed the significance of this principle. 10 Only a State can become a title-holder of terra res nullius through effective occupation and "continuous and peaceful exercise"of State authority over a reasonable period of time. Occupation by private individuals will not create a title for their country. Discovery with the intention to possess can give rise to an inchoate title but is insufficient to ensure the right to possess terra res nullius territory. The inchoate title must be consolidated by realizing the State intention to possess terra res nullius, by the actual, effective occupation and administration for a certain period of time. 11 International law also recognizes that in the case of claims on sparsely populated and remote territories, a permanent presence is not always necessary. 12 Quoting geographic references, some Chinese authors have maintained that the Paracels and Spratlys have been discovered, named, and managed by China since the East Han Dynasty (25-220 A.D.). However, according to studies carried out by Western scholars, no reference is made to Chinese sovereignty over the islets. 13 The following six observations may be made with regard to the Chinese sources used to prove Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys.
First Yinghuan Zhilue (Summary Geography of the Globe) by Xu Jishe (1848). They mention 'magnetic stones'or, 'exotic things'in the sea without any exact description or reference to distances to the coast. Reference to these works by modern Chinese authors offer no solid scientific ground for concluding either that the locations mentioned in these works are really the Paracels and the Spratlys, or that those locations have belonged to China for more than two thousand years.
Second, those names as Jiurulozhou, Wanlizhitang, Wanlichengsha, Qianlishitang, Qizhouyang, and Qizhousan have been used in several different ways, which make it difficult for foreign researchers to follow. 14 Chinese authors did not specify the location and names of the islands. This no doubt led to endless variations in translation and disagreements among scholars over the uniformity of the names. Simple references to these vague names cannot justify sovereignty. The names Xisha or Nansha did not exist until the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1935, the name Nansha denoted the Maccleshfield Bank and has been used to refer to the Spratlys only since 1947. 15 Third, the descriptions of those sandbanks are linked to the 'barbarian'nations of the south-west, which strongly suggest that those foreign territories did not belong to China. The Zhongguo Dilixue Jiaokeshu (Manual of Geography of China) compiled in 1905 and published in 1906, noted in the chapter Generalities (page 24) that the Chinese territory is bound "[i]n the South at North latitude 18。 13、 , the terminus being the coast of Yazhou, island of Hainan."In some Chinese history books, the Paracels were recognized as belonging to Vietnam. Hai Lu wrote: "Van Ly Truong Sa is a sandbank rising above the sea. Several thousand leagues in length, it forms a rampart on the periphery of the Kingdom of Annam (Vietnam)." 16 Fourth, there is no convincing evidence about China' s state management over these marine features. 17 For a period of two thousand years until 1909, only four events have been cited by Chinese authors to claim Chinese management. 18 However, a closer look at these claims paints a different picture. The events took place around the Hainan Island. There is neither proof, nor a name directly relating to the Paracels. The period of one to two hundred years between these events do not support the existence of a continuous, non-interrupted period of Chinese management. While Chinese official records and books recognized that this country' s maritime frontier stops at the Hainan Island, the existence of Chinese maritime patrols outside that limit could only be considered as speculation. 19 In addition, private activities of navigators or fishermen, if any, cannot serve to establish the Chinese sovereignty over the territories.
Fifth, in some cases since the nineteenth century, the conduct of the Chinese authorities showed that they did not have any claim over the Paracels. In French archives, the German ship 'Bellona'and the Japanese ship 'Imegi Maru'shipwrecked in the Paracels in 1895-1896, 20 which adversely affects the Chinese position. The copper transported by the two ships and insured by British companies, were stolen by Chinese fishermen. Officials in Hainan were requested by the British Minister in Beijing and Consulates in Hoihow to take precautionary measures to prevent looting and to transfer back the stolen copper. The Chinese authorities denied liability. The Viceroy of Canton countered the protests of the Minister of Great Britain in Peking by stating that: "The Paracels are abandoned islands, which belong no more to China than to Viet Nam, they are not administratively attached to any district of Hainan and no special authority is responsible for policing them." 21 In analyzing these texts, one can no longer doubt that the Chinese authorities had no intention to assert sovereignty over the islands. These events confirmed China' s indifference to the Paracels, even at the end of the nineteenth century. The Vietnamese books, Phu Bien Tap Luc (撫邊雜錄‚ -Miscellany on the Government of the Marches, 1776) and Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (Accounts about Dai Nam' s Present Dynasty) discussed another case in which Chinese authorities gave assistance to Vietnamese sailors operating in the Paracels. In Phu Bien Tap Luc, Le Quy Don wrote as follows:
The shoals of Hoang Sa are in the proximity of Lianzhou, island of Hainan. Fishermen of our country sometimes met the fishing junks of the men of the North on the sea. On the high seas, people of the two countries asked one another about their activities. I myself saw a note which the Mandarin-Chief of the district of Wonchang of Qiongzhou addressed to the prefecture of Thuan Haa in which he said: "In the 18th year of the reign of Qianlong, ten military men native of the commune of An Vinh, company Cat Liem, district of Chu ' o ' Nghia of Annam, one day in the 7th month, arrived in Wanlichangsha for fishing and gathering merchandise. Eight of them set foot on land, leaving the two others to guard the junk. The mooring rope was broken by the wind, the junk was pushed by the waves as far as the port of Quang Lan, where the local authorities could verify the facts and sent these men to their native country. Seigneur Nguyen Phuc Chu ordered the Cai Ba . of Thuan Hoa, Thuc Luong Hau, to make a note in answer." 22 In addition, China put forward the argument that Vietnam had been its vassal before the French colonial period and consequently, that all actions by the feudal state of Vietnam over the Paracels were made on behalf of China. 23 In fact, the vassalage of Vietnam to China was only ever nominal; Vietnam was always an independent sovereign State. 24 When Vietnam signed the Treaty of Protectorate, known as the Pateno ＾ tre Treaty with France on June 6, 1884, 25 China did not make any reservation on any vassal status of Vietnam to China. It shows that matters regarding Vietnam' s sovereignty did not depend on China. Arguments related to a vassal regime do not help China' s position because, while recognizing the Nguyen Lords and Kings' s possession of the Paracels "on behalf of China,"China -the 'Protectorate State' -recognized that it has neither any activity, nor had any element, corpus and animus, over the Paracels under international law. 26 Finally, no evidence of international recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels or the Spratlys during the period from the Han Dynasty has been provided.
The existence of dangerous islets had been recorded by Western explorers, at least since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries under various names such as Pulo Pracela, Pracels, Isle Pracel, or Paracels. 27 The name Spratley was used for the first time in 1843. 28 Those archipelagos might be terra res nullius until the seventeenth century.
State actions to possess the Paracels and Spratlys were first recorded in official historical accounts under the Vietnamese Nguyen Dynasty at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and later in the Western and Chinese record books.
The During the early days of the dynasty, the Hoang Sa detachment was created and it was made up of 70 men recruited from among An Vinh villagers. It set out every year in the third month and used to reach the islands after a three days and nights voyage. There the men collected articles from wrecked ships. Its home trip would normally begin in the eighth month of the year. In addition, there was a Bac Hai team whose members were recruited from Tu Chinh commune in Binh Thuan province or from Canh Duong village. The team was sent to Bac Hai areas and the island of Con Lon to gather articles from wrecked ships. The Bac Hai team was placed under the Hoang Sa detachment commander. 31 Besides official historical records, the Vietnamese sources relating to the Paracels and the Spratlys include royal orders in the king' s handwriting, comments, signature in red ink and seals, geographic records and maps, family annals, collection of folk-songs, and custom. They are preserved to the present day in Ly Son Island, the main naval base of 34 The solo-note of the Ministry for Internal Affairs dated December 28, 1847 stated: "Every year in Spring, as a rule, a crew of soldiers is dispatched to visit Hoang Sa (Paracels), which belong to our home sea for improving knowledge on the routes. In the fifth year of Thieu Tri (1845), a royal order postponed the annual visit due to busy schedule." 35 In the genealogies of the Pham and Dang families of Ly Son Island, some royal orders of King Ming Mang, which have been well preserved, show that young and strong swimmers were ordered to join the Hoang Sa detachment. After studying those documents, Monique Chemillier Gendreau drew the following conclusion: "They make it abundantly clear that the Vietnamese emperors pursued the task of organizing (as mentioned in an account of 1776) a maritime company whose purpose was the economic exploitation and maritime exploration of the archipelagos. These measures formed part of national policy with a concern for maritime interests." 36 Second, the names Bai Cat Vang (Golden Sandbank), Hoang Sa (黃沙; English: Golden Sand), Va . n Ly Hoa 、 ng Sa (萬里黃沙; Ten-Thousand-Ly Golden Sand), Dai Truong Sa (大長沙; Great Long Sand), or Van Ly Truong Sa (萬里長沙; Ten-ThousandLy Long Sand) indicate an area with various Paracel and Spratly features. 37 In the early 176 sG¤G¤yhvzfo 32 Tac, thuoc are measure units in the old feudal regime of Vietnam. 33 The Royal Handwriting Collection under the Ming Mang Regime, vol. 64, at 143, conserved at the Sino-Vietnamese Institute, Hanoi-Vietnam. 34 Id. at 146. 35 The Seventh year of Thieu Tri' s reign, in Book 51 of Thieu Tri' s royal notes, at 235. 36 Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 76. To the East of the island Re (Ly Son), Binh Son district, is Hoang Sa, which can be reached from the Sa Ky coast in 3 to 4 days and nights with a favourable wind. The archipelago comprises in all more than 130 peaks separated from one another by one day or by a few geng. In the middle of the archipelago is the Hoang Sa (Yellow Sand Shoals, which spreads over one doesn't know how many thousand dam, commonly called Van Ly Truong Sa (Ten-Thousand-Ly Long Sand); fresh water, sea birds in innumerable flocks, holothurians, snails and goods from wrecked ships are found there. 38 The popular Vietnamese names Hoang Sa (Cat Vang -Yellow Sand), Va . Indisputable Sovereignty of Viet Nam over the Paracel Islands, published online on Jan. 30, 2011, available at http://www.biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/Media/bbg/News/Archives/vie/chu%20quyen%20tren%202%20quan%20dao%20Ho ang%20Sa%20-%20Truong%20sa.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012). 38 Luu, supra note 6, at 35. 39 Jean-Louis Taberd, Note on the Geography of Cochinchina, 6 J. ASIATIC SOC' Y BENGAL 737-745 (1837). 40 Id. 41 "Tabula Geographica Imperii Anamitici"is attached in the 1938 Latin-Annamese Dictionary (Dictionarium LatinoAnamiticum). See Luu, supra note 6, at 98. 42 Nguyen, supra note 15, at 38. Subsequently, during the Nguyen Dynasty, references to the two distinct archipelagos became clearer. The name, Hoang Sa was kept for the Paracels, and Truong Sa for the Spratlys. In Dai Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do (The Complete Map of the Unified Dai Nam), published in 1838, each archipelago has its own name: Van Ly Truong Sa and Hoang Sa. However, they are still presented on the map as a unit encircled by dotted lines. From an administrative point of view, ancient documents frequently mentioned another team called Bǎ 、 c Hai, which was part of Hoang Sa detachment in charge of the southern part ι of the SCS and Poulo Condore region. 43 Activities of the Bac Hai detachment appeared to concern the Spratlys area. 44 At the time, the number of islands and rocks of both archipelagos was estimated at approximately 130.
The inaccuracy of Vietnam' s technical charts at that time can be seen in Portugese and Dutch maps. The islands were represented by a series of points off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to distinguish the Spratlys from the Paracels. These points usually denote dangerous grounds to be avoided by marine vessels. They may be found in a number of western nautical maps depicting the Paracel and the Spratly Islands as a single archipelago located to the east of Viet Nam' s mainland, e.g.:
�The map by Bartholomen Velho (1560) Fourth, the Vietnamese State activities in Paracels and Spratlys were comprehensive, continuous, peaceful, and uncontested. Five types of activities were implemented as follows:
1. The systematic exploitation of the islands; 2. The organization of the geographical surveys to better know the islands and routes, and to control and survey the sea; 3. The building of shrines and temples, and the planting of trees as a symbol of sovereignty over the islands; 4. The organization of local tax revenue collection and commercial exchanges with other countries; and 5. Providing assistance to foreign vessels in distress. (silver, tin, porcelain bowls, and copper guns).
With the establishment of a military unit dedicated to exploring the islands, the Vietnamese monarchs (Nguyen Lords and Kings, and Tay Son Rulers and Kings) made clear their determination to put Paracels and Spratlys under their sovereignty. This activity was conducted annually under state order. Even under the Tay Son Dynasty, the mission was maintained continuously during the time of internal conflict. 50 The soldiers of the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai detachments were exempted from personal tax collection and rewarded with money. Conversely, those who did not complete the task were punished according to the gravity of their failure. 51 In the early years of his rule, King Gia Long paid attention to the mapping of the territory. Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien and other historical records provide his programme. In 1815, King Gia Long ordered Pham Quang Anh of the Hoang Sa detachment to "go to the Ho ng Sa to study and to chart the maritime routes."In the year Binh Ty, the 15 th year of the reign of Gia Long (1816), the King ordered the navy and the Hoang Sa detachment to go in junks to the Hoang Sa to study and measure maritime routes. This programme was continued by King Ming Mang. More detailed instructions were given in the matter of cartography. Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien recorded an instruction in 1836 as follows:
Everything shall be noted and described in detail for submission to the supreme attention of His Majesty. As soon as the junks reach any island or sandbank, regardless of what kind, they shall from that point measure the length, breadth, height, surface area, and circumference of that island or sandbank, the depth of the surrounding waters, identify any submerged sandbanks or reefs, record whether access is dangerous or poses no problem, undertake a careful examination of the terrain, take measurements and make a sketch. 52 Temples and sovereignty markers were built and trees were planted as sovereign manifestations. They constitute the state management of the territory consistent with the requirements of international law (the animus and corpus elements and the continuous actions). The Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien wrote:
In the eighth month, in the autumn, of the year Quy 、Ty, the 14 th year of the reign of Minh Mang (1833)... the King told the Ministry of Public Works: On Hoang Sa in the waters of Quang Nghia, in the distance, one can see the sky and the sea join in the same colour, which makes it difficult to estimate the depth of the sea. Recently, commercial vessels sunk there... In year late (1836), the Ministry of Public Works reported:... the land of Hoang Sa belongs to our territorial sea and is of great strategic importance...We have sent our men there to draw maps, but in view of the large area of the sea and of its distance, we have managed to carry it out in one place and we don' t know how to continue the work... The King approved the report and gave order to the Suat Doi (Commander) of the navy, Pham Huu Nhat, to lead the fleet and to prepare 10 wooden posts to mark the visited places (each post is 5 thuoc long, 5 tac wide, and 1 tac thick). Each post bears the following inscription engraved on one of its faces: the Chanh Doi truong Suat Doi Pham Huu Nhat of the navy has come here to the Hoang Sa for reconnaissance and topographical measures, and leaves this witness-post to mark the fact. 53 In 1849, the Englishman, J. Gutzlaff, wrote about the tax collection and fishermen protection of Vietnamese Kingdom on the Paracels as follows:
We should not mention here the Paracels (Katvang) which approach 15-20 leagues to the coast of Annam, and extend between 15。 -17。 N. Latitude and 111。 -113。 E. Longitude, if the King of Cochin-China did not claim these as his property, and many isles and reefs, so dangerous to navigators... From time immemorial, junks in large number from Hainan, have annually visited all these shoals, and proceeded in their excursions as far as the coast of Borneo... The Annam government, perceiving the advantages which it might derive if atoll were raised, keeps revenue cutters and a small garrison on the spot to collect the duty on all visitors, and to ensure protection to its own fishermen. 54 The assistance which the Nguyen Rulers provided to foreign ships in the dangerous grounds was also recorded. At least two cases had been recorded regarding Dutch ships: the Gootebrok, wrecked in 1634 in the sea of the Paracels, and three Dutch sailed ships coining back from Japan and going to Batavia in 1714 near the Paracels, were surprised by a tempest. 55 Report of the Governor of Da Nang, dated the 11 th year of Minh Mang (1830) recorded the assistance to a French merchant ship sunk in Hoang Sa. 56 By Quoc Trieu Chinh Bien Toat Yeu (National Dynasty Chronology) in 1836, a British merchant ship shipwrecked in an open ground near the Paracels. More than 90 sailors from this ship managed to reach the shores of Binh Dinh. 57 In all cases, Lords and Kings of the Nguyen gave them shelter, money, and food before repatriation.
Fifth, Vietnamese State activities on Paracels and Spratlys were noted in several foreign works, including the Chinese works. J.B. Chaigneau, Counsellor of Emperor Gia Long, writes in his memoirs as follows:
Cochinchina, the sovereign of which has today the title of Emperor, is composed of Cochinchina proper, Tonquin, a part of the kingdom of Cambodia, some uninhabited islands not far from the coast and the Paracels archipelago, composed of uninhabited reefs and rocks. It is only in 1816 that the present Emperor took possession of this archipelago. 58 The Italian Compendium of Geography written by Adriano Balbi in 1850 (page 641) described the Annam Kingdom and its belongings as Paracels, Pirates Islands, and Puolo Condor. In the section dealing with Chinese geography of the same book, there was nothing about the Paracels or Spratlys.
Shi Da Shan, a Chinese high monk under the Kangxi reign, wrote in his Story Overseas (Volume III) that:
[T]he sandbanks, which had a width of one hundred miles dam, a very long length, out of sight, was called "Van Ly Truong Sa," no tree, no house. The junks so against the wind and attacked by the waves swirling would be either completely destroyed, or sailors deprived of rice and portable water would die of hunger. This place was far from Dai Viet to a seven days of navigation, i.e. about seven hundred dam (miles). In the time of the Lords (Nguyen), every year, they had sent the fishing junks sailing along of the sand to pick the gold, silver and gears on the shipwrecks. 59 These facts, taken from Vietnamese historical documents and notes of various foreign authors, demonstrate that the Nguyen Lords and Kings of Vietnam, in the pre-colonial period, displayed specific interest in the archipelagos, and performed sovereign acts there at a time when no other State had shown any sovereign interest towards them. 
B. From the Early Twentieth Century to the End of World War II
International law on territorial acquisition has changed profoundly. The two obligations related to effective occupation formulated by the Berlin General Act of 1885. Originally applied only to African territories became the rule of general international law to guide the search for a legal solution to the territorial disputes. They have been consolidated and developed by numerous cases related to the acquisition of sovereignty over the uninhabited islands. 62 For terra res nullius, the rules for acquisition of sovereignty are effective, uninterrupted, and peaceful occupation, as well as an official notification of the occupation and rights of the claimant to other powers through the diplomatic channel. Terra res dereclictio, abandoned territories, can be taken by a new claimant through its effective, uninterrupted, and peaceful occupation of the territory, and an official relinquisition of the old State possessing the sovereign title over that territory. 63 The territory can be also acquired through the way of cession from a State to a new one through international agreement. The use of force to conquer a territory was prohibited by the United Nations Charter and other international legal instruments. During the post war period, the right of self-determination of peoples has been recognized in international law. All armed actions or repressive measures directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 64 Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 65 The two archipelagos have been under the administration of Vietnamese Dynasties since at least the seventeenth century. The sovereign title over those islands has been consolidated and maintained for centuries, before the arrival of the French.
The French colonial authority in Indochina, which was responsible for the external relations of the Vietnamese Kingdom, 66 recognized its State succession status over the Hoang Sa islands from the Vietnamese Kingdom. 67 The French colonial authority carried out several acts to consolidate the sovereign title over Hoang Sa islands such as: granting licences for private companies to exploit the islands in 1898; preparing the establishment of navigational lighthouses in 1899; 68 A newly found imperial ordinance signed by Emperor Bao Dai, the Honor Award, was presented to the division and officials stationed on the Paracels is further proof of the Vietnam' s exercise of authority over the islands. 70 In that context, the expedition carried out by Chinese Admiral Li Zhun in 1909 was 76 No matter whether the rights of the ancient Vietnamese Kingdom were lost or abandoned, the effective occupation by French authorities over the Spratlys additionally consolidated the historic rights of the Vietnamese Kingdom.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 also supports Vietnam' s position. In Article 2, paragraph (f) of the Treaty, Japan relinquished all rights, titles, and claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. Mr. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR during the San Francisco Conference, offered a proposal to give those islands to the Chinese administration (who was absent from the Conference), which was rejected by a 48 to 3 vote. Based on the texts of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, Article 2 paragraph (f), which refers to the Paracels and Spratlys, was separated from the paragraph that refers to territories intended to be assigned to China. The text of the Cairo Declaration of 1943 classified the territories over which Japan had to relinquish all rights, titles, and claims into the three kinds: Pacific islands, Chinese territories, and other territories seized by force. The Declaration committed to "divest Japan of all the Pacific islands... to restore to the Chinese Republic all the territories such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Percadores which the Japanese had stolen from the Chinese, and to expel Japan from all other territories it has seized by force." 77 The Paracels and Spratlys islands were not referred to as Chinese territories during the three international conferences of Cairo, Potsdam, and San Francisco. Clearly, they were territories that Japan acquired through the use force and should have been returned to their prior owners. However, these conferences did not even suggest that the owner was China. The silence of the ROC at the Cairo and the Potsdam conferences regarding the Paracels and the Spralys constitutes proof of the Chinese indifference to these islands. 78 83 The China maintains its position that the Paracels and the Spratlys belongs to it and that Vietnam has more than once recognized China' s sovereignty over these islands. 86 92 The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case recalls that: "If States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for." 93 Through State practices and the Court' s judgments, 94 the International Law Commission ( "ILC" ) gives guidelines for defining unilateral acts and their legal force. 95 According to the ILC, to determine the legal effects of unilateral declarations, it is necessary to take account of the content, the factual circumstances in which they were made, and to the reactions to which they gave rise. A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear and specific terms. In case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a declaration, these obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. In interpreting the content of such obligations, weight shall be given first and foremost to the text of the declaration, together with the context and the circumstances in which it was formulated. 96 In applying those guidelines, we have some remarks on the text of the letter of PM Pham Van Dong, and the circumstances in which it was formulated.
First, the DRV at that time was not in control of the Paracels and Spratlys. By the Geneva Accords, Vietnam was divided temporally into two Administrations at the 17 th parallel, pending reunification through free general elections. China is one of the signatories of the Geneva Accords. The two archipelagos Paracels and Spratlys, lying under the 17 th parallel, were under the administration of the ROV. At that time, the DRV neither had de jure title nor exercised de facto sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratly. It had no right to give up the territory that it did not have. 97 Even the South Vietnamese Authorities, the two opposing governments, the ROV, and the Provisional only had the right of administration over the two islands, but not the right to concede any part of the territory to foreigners. In 1974, the PRG strongly replied upon the Chinese use of force when made the following three-point declaration: 98 �Sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred problems for every people;
�With regard to the problem of frontiers and territories, there exist between neighbouring countries differences left behind by history. These differences, sometimes very complex, call for minute examination; and �The countries concerned should examine this problem in a spirit of equality, mutual respect, and as good neighbours, should resolve it through negotiations.
The declaration recognized the existence of a dispute, recalling that sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred issues for all peoples, further calling for negotiation. On constitutive character regarding South Vietnamese territory. Consequently, it had no conclusive legal effect on the fate of the Paracels and Spratlys.
Third, the DRV has never denied the claims and activities reaffirming sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys by South Vietnam. If PM Pham Van Dong' s letter had recognized the sovereignty of China, the next logical step would have been a declaration to reject the sovereignty of the ROV government. This never occurred, either in 1956 or 1974. The DRV continued to support the stance of the PRG.
Fourth, the name of the Chinese text in 1958 is the Declaration on China' s territorial sea. PM Pham Van Dong' s letter recognizes and approves the decision regarding the 12 nm breadth for China' s territorial sea. It did not contain any renunciation of sovereignty over the islands in favour of China. The transfer of territorial sovereignty from one State to another is normally executed by treaty. Immediately after the struggle against the French colonial army in November 2, 1957, the Central Committee of the ruling Vietnam Labor Party sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposing that the two parties had to respect the status quo over territorial issues left by history, and resolve all disputes through peaceful negotiations at a convenient time. The letter of November 1957 said: "The border issue is an important issue to be settled by the present legal principles or determined by the two governments." 101 In April 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China gave a positive response to its counterpart. The territorial issues left by history were understood as being solely concerned with land borders; no mention was made regarding the Paracels or Spratlys. During the war against the United States, it was agreed that all potential disputes between the two brother countries were to be settled at a convenient time through negotiations. The declaration made by PM Pham Van Dong was not in the context of a dispute between Hanoi and Beijing. The ICJ adjudicated: "Nothing prevents the parties from coming to an agreement by way of common sense: it is an agreement with the conditions of reciprocity." 102 Some authors compared the letter made by PM Pham Van Dong with the Ihlen Declaration in the Greenland Case. 103 Fifth, during the war, Vietnam relied quite heavily on material assistance from China. This put Hanoi in an awkward position. The letter endorsed only the application of the principle of 12 nm for the breath of the territorial sea. It was an act of good will from North Vietnam to support China, which faced the risk of an invasion by the United States as it was manoeuvring close to the Taiwan Strait. The reservation on the status of the Paracels and Spratlys was not expressed because PM Pham Van Dong had no competence with respect to them.
Monique Chemillier Gendreau remarks that: "It is true that Pham Van Dong' s declaration confines itself strictly to recognition of the breadth of the Chinese territorial sea. So it is incorrect to assert that Vietnam had also "reaffirmed its recognition of China's claim"to the archipelagos." 104 No recognition of Chinese sovereignty was made by either the DRV or the ROV.
Does the letter of PM Pham Van Dong have the effect of estoppel? "You can' t have your cake and eat it, too"is a principle which prevents States from acting inconsistently to the detriment of others. 105 According to Ian Brownlie, it is now clear that the essence of estoppels is the element of conduct which detrimentally causes the other party, in reliance of such conduct, to change its position and suffer some prejudice. 106 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ pointed out that: "The party relying on estoppels must show, among other things, that it has taken distinct acts in reliance [of] the other party' s statement." 107 The letter of PM Pham Van Dong did not fulfil all conditions, especially the condition on 'detrimental reliance'necessary to create the estoppel for China. First, China did not prove that its position on the Xisha and Nansha has changed detrimentally due to reliance on North Vietnam' s declaration. Second, China kept silent over the U.S. Armed Forces'declaration regarding the combat zone in the SCS in 1965, which included the Paracels. Did this imply Chinese indifference to the defence of its claims over the Paracels before the foreign invasion? Third, the estoppel principle is applied to the acts of one author on an issue in a continuous period of history. In this case, how would estoppel be applied to the conducts of two distinct governments that is, the DRV and SRV? The first had no territorial competence over the islands in question. The second is a successor of the former DRV and ROV, and has the right to choose which entity' s rights and obligations to inherit. The SRV inherits the rights and actions of South Vietnam, which alone has jurisdiction over the Paracels and Spratlys. 108
Vietnamese Position on the Maritime Zones around the Islands
The development of the International Law of the Sea gives rise to maritime delimitation problems between the opposite and adjacent States. Being located in the middle of the SCS, the Paracels and the Spratlys directly affect the issue of maritime delimitation between the offshore islands and the mainland territory of coastal States. It has an enormous impact on the extension of continental shelves, the freedom and security of navigation, and the management of resources. The UNCLOS has created a new kind of dispute in the SCS. The maritime delimitation of offshore islands is closely linked to the determination of sovereignty over them and the regime of their maritime zones. In this part, we will look at the Vietnamese position on the maritime zones around the islands. Three questions will be examined: the Vietnamese position on the maritime zones under the UNCLOS; the regimes of Paracels and Spratlys islands; and the maritime disputes relating to the islands. territorial sea created a basic legal foundation for the building of Vietnam' s system of marine legislation. On June 23, 1994, during its 5 th session, the Ninth National Assembly of Vietnam passed the Resolution on the Ratification of the UNCLOS. The Resolution reflected the determination of Vietnam to build a just and equitable legal order for the seas, encouraging marine development and cooperation. It also confirmed the sovereignty of Vietnam over its internal waters and territorial sea, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf on the basis of the provisions of the UNCLOS and principles of international law. 109 With its accession to the UNCLOS, Vietnam is entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nm, an EEZ of 200 nm, a continental shelf of at least 200 nm, which is expandable to 350 nm measured from the baseline, or to 100 nm measured from the isobar of 2,500 meters in depth. For the Paracels and Spratlys, the baselines and surrounding maritime zones will later be fixed in conformity with the UNCLOS. The Convention has served as a firm international legal ground for the struggle to protect Vietnam' s seas and continental shelf, as well as its legitimate rights and interests on the sea and its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos. The UNCLOS is a common legal basis for the settlement of disputes over the maritime delimitation between Vietnam and its neighbours, contributing to creating an environment for stability, peace, cooperation, and development in the East Sea of Vietnam (SCS).
A. Vietnamese Position on the Maritime Zones under the UNCLOS

B. Legal Status of Paracels and Spratlys Islands
The question of determining the marine zones of the Paracels and Spratlys islands 110 was mentioned in the Resolution of the Ninth National Assembly (5 th session) of the SRV on June 23, 1994, upon the ratification of the UNCLOS. 111 Due to the complicated nature of the disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys, and pending negotiations, Vietnam has not defined the scope of maritime zones around the islands. The baseline and the maritime zones around the islands will be defined in future legislations, such as the Law on Maritime Zones of Vietnam, or by the agreements on delimitation with other concerned parties. 112 Through official documents on maritime zones issued by Vietnam and its practices, however, the regime of islands in the SCS must be defined according to the following three conditions: (1) The regime of offshore islands must be in conformity with the UNCLOS; (2) The regime of offshore islands cannot affect the natural extension of the continental shelf from the Vietnamese mainland as per the UNCLOS; and (3) The offshore islands cannot be given equal treatment with the land in maritime delimitation. Paracels and Spratlys consist of a number of islands, rocks, and low-tide elevations, some of whose exact data are not yet available. However, it is generally agreed that most of them cannot sustain human habitation. Regular garrisons on the islands have been operated since World War II. The unclear definition of 'rocks'under article 121 (3) of the UNCLOS leads to different interpretations regarding the legal status of Paracels and Spratlys. Unresolved questions may include: (1) What size and height would be required in order to qualify an object as an island or rock?; (2) When is a rock capable of sustaining human habitation?; (3) In the case of uninhabited rocks, if people and governments supply construction works, water, and food, would it be possible to meet the requirements of Article 121 (3)?; (4) In relation to a rock, what is the definition of "an economic life of its own" ?; (5) If a lighthouse, runway, meteorological, hydrological station, bird sanctuary, marine park, gas and oil exploration station, or other economic projects are built on a rock, would this qualify as distinct economic life?; (6) Do islands and rocks have the same regime as mainland regime?; (7) Can they be treated as mainland to get full territorial water rights, the EEZ, or continental shelf?; and (8) What is the effect of islands and rocks in delimiting the maritime zones of the mainland? 113 Michael Richardson and Pan Shiying consider that in the Spratlys, only the Ba Binh island (English: Itu Aba/Chinese: Taiping Dao) satisfies the conditions under Article 121 (3) and is qualified to have its own EEZ and continental shelf. 114 Accounting for current operations to consolidate management of claimant parties, Yann Huei Song considers that five islands and rocks that can have their own EEZs and continental shelves. 115 . Although each of these islands has an area of less than 1㎢, almost all have a runway and military and civil constructions. Some islands have civilians and bases for tourism. R. W. Smith noted that many experts on the law of the sea would argue that most of, if not all, the islands in the SCS should be considered as rocks under Article 121 (3), and thus could not generate full maritime zones. 116 State practice and past judgments by the ICJ suggest that in view of their size, living conditions, and economic life of their own, rocks and islands in the SCS can not have the same legal effect as the mainland in generating maritime zones. 117 The Tu Chinh Bank case pushed Vietnam into expressing a clearer position on the regime of islands. On May 8, 1992, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company signed with Crestone (American Oil Company) as so-called "contract on petroleum exploration on North Vanguard 21"covering the Tu Chinh bank (Chinese: Wan An Bei) on the continental shelf of Vietnam. China argued that the bank located in waters adjacent to their 'Nansha'(Spratlys) archipelago, so it also belongs to the 'territory'of China. On May 19, 1992, the Vietnamese Permanent Mission to the United Nations sent a note to State members of the organization to confirm that the Tu Chinh area "is located on the continental shelf of Vietnam, outside the periphery of the Truong Sa 198 sG¤G¤yhvzfo Archipelago." 118 In fact, the Tu Chinh bank consists of the low-tide elevations located on the prolongation of the southern continental shelf of Vietnam. It is over 50 nm from the nearest island of Truong Sa (Spratlys) archipelago and separated from this archipelago by a 2,000 meters deep trench. Thus, it can not be regarded as 'dependent'on any island of this archipelago. The Tu Chinh area does not clearly belong to the territory, or continental shelf of China. It is 600 nm from mainland China, almost twice of maximum distance of 350 nm from the baselines provided under the international law of the sea. The Sparatlys islands can not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, either. Therefore, they cannot have their own continental shelf, nor be regarded as an 'archipelagic State'based on which continental shelf could be claimed. This position is supported by the international community. Greg Torode mentioned that: "Not only has China no right to the Spratly Islands, but no island in the archipelago is big enough to claim a 320 km zone effectively destroying China' s claim to the Wan' an Bei field." 119 From geological considerations, such as distance and depth provided in the UNCLOS, it is easily concluded that this area belongs to the continental shelf from the Vietnamese mainland. 120 In implementing the obligations of the member States of the UNCLOS to lodge claims for extended continental shelves before the May 13, 2009 deadline, Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a joint proposal on May 6, 2009. The following day, 121 Vietnam also presented its own partial submission relating to the north area, located northwest of the SCS. 122 Both submissions present claims for extended continental shelves from the mainland; the two countries assert they are without prejudice to the maritime delimitation with other relevant coastal States. Vietnam and Malaysia pursued a policy of separating the submission for extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm from maritime disputes over insular formations. The Paracels and Spratly archipelagos, subjects to sovereignty claims in the SCS, were not mentioned as base points. 123 Both States seem to share the view that the disputed insular formations remain subject to negotiations, and all or almost all of them must have only territorial seas. The conducts of Brunei and the Philippines show that they have the same position on the regime of islands. In its preliminary information provided to the CLCS, Brunei informs that its future submission will be based on the continuous natural China has never revealed exactly what it claims within the "nine dotted line."Chinese scholars have, however, run the whole gamut of interpretations as to the nature of the line, from a national boundary claim, 135 (that on either all features and of the waters as historic waters, 136 or the islands and their adjacent waters), 137 to a claim of ownership of the islands and historic rights in the SCS. 138 Based on these arguments, China has imposed a unilateral moratorium on fishing since 1999 and arrested fishermen of other coastal States traditionally fishing in their EEZs. China has challenged the "freedom of navigation"in the SCS by harassing U.S. Navy ships. 139 The Chinese stance based on the "nine-dotted line"is criticized by the international community. Several countries, both claimants and non-claimants in the SCS, presented the Notes Verbales to the United Nations to protest these lines. Shelf Act of 1998). However, the limits of these maritime zones drawn in accordance with the UNCLOS have never coincided with the "nine dotted line."In the Dubai/Sharjan case of 1981, the Arbitral Award mentioned that: "The principle of the stability of boundaries -boundaries established here by administrative decisions and not arising by Treaty or in consequence of an arbitral award -depends precisely upon their recognition and effective application in subsequent practice." 148 Obviously, the "nine dotted line"has not got any recognition or effective application in subsequent practice. In addition, the Chinese argument that the "nine dotted line"indicates historic waters is not convincing. 149 First, Travaux Pre 、 paratoires to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958, in the list of the world' s historic waters, do not mention the U-shaped historic waters in the SCS. Second, according to Article 15 of the UNCLOS, the concept of historic title can be applied only during the delimitation of the territorial sea of 12 nm between States with the opposite or adjacent coasts in exceptional case. There is no provision in the UNCLOS for historic titles to the sea beyond 12 nm from the baseline, while the "nine dotted line"is several hundred nautical miles from China' s coast. Third, the concept of historic waters is inconsistent with the laws, regulations, and official statements of China on territorial waters, the EEZ, and the continental shelf. By the 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, China recognized the high sea outside the territorial sea. China' s 1996 ratification of the UNCLOS implies that whatever historic rights were claimed by China over natural resources before that date, in areas that are now the EEZ or continental shelf of other States, must be given up, because legal relations between State members of the UNCLOS including China are now governed by the Convention. China cannot use its domestic law as an excuse not to fulfil its international obligations under the UNCLOS. 150 Fourth, the "nine dotted line"is arbitrarily drawn; it starts from neither the mainland, nor an island. It is inconsistent with the principle that: "The land dominates the seas."Such a line cannot grant the claimant country a marine zone that would be inconsistent with the provisions of the UNCLOS, or sovereignty over the islands and reefs within this line. Fifth, the "nine dotted line"affects not only countries having sovereignty disputes, but also the rights and freedoms of navigation, the maritime and airspace security of the regional and the world communities.
Vietnamese Position on the Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea
Having been a victim of the use of force in the sovereignty disputes over the Paracels and the Spratlys, Vietnam recognizes very well the value of peace; it tries to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes in the SCS. This position has been reaffirmed in all Vietnamese official texts and speeches, such as the Government Declarations of 1977 and 1982. The National Resolution on ratification of the UNCLOS in 1994 states that:
The National Assembly reaffirms the sovereignty of Vietnam over the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa and Vietnam advocates the settlement of differences related to Bien Dong through peaceful negotiations, based on equity, understanding, and mutual respect in conformity with international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, respect of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coastal States in the EEZ and the continental shelf. While endeavouring to advance the negotiations for seeking fundamental and long-term solutions, the parties involved must maintain stability and the status-quo, avoid complicating the situation, avoid the use of force or the threat of using force. 151 In addition, Vietnam also advocates the settlement of maritime disputes through direct negotiations in good faith on the basis of mutual respect for the legitimate rights and interests of the involved parties in order to reach an agreement on an equitable and reasonable solution accepted by all the parties. This view of Vietnam is entirely in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, and other international law and custom. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam has taken the lead in the settlement of maritime delimitation issues in accordance with the UNCLOS. It has signed the Agreement on Maritime Delimitation with Thailand on August 9, 1997, the Agreement on the Delimitation of Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf, the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in Bac Bo Gulf with China on December 25, 2000, and the Agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelves with Indonesia on June 26, 2003. 152 Vietnam has, however, not stuck to a rigid view. In negotiations to reach a final delineation solution, if necessary and on the basis of mutual agreement, Vietnam and its counterpart countries may elect to make provisional arrangements in the spirit of Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS. Vietnam has recognized historical waters under the joint management with Cambodia since 1982. In 1992, it has reached an agreement with Malaysia on joint petroleum exploitations in the overlapping area, and then, accelerated negotiations on joint petroleum exploitations in the overlapping areas of Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia (negotiations started in 1998). The form of joint exploitation has been also applied to delimited areas such as the Common Fishery Zone and the Transitory Fishery Zone with China in Bac Bo Gulf (entered into force on June 30, 2004). With its practice and experience, Vietnam is one of the countries which have the most joint exploitation agreements in the world. However, Vietnam has never accepted the idea of "Chinese sovereignty, setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development." 153 Regarding disputes in the SCS, Vietnam has taken many initiatives in seeking peaceful settlement through both bilateral and multilateral channels. A forum has been created for negotiations on maritime issues with China since 1993. In 1994, the Joint Oceanographic temporary measures that do not affect each side' s stance and policies, including research and discussions on cooperation for mutual development. The basis of settlement of maritime disputes in the SCS can be summarized as follows:
�Legal regime and principles defined by international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
�Agreements and common perceptions reached by the high-ranking leaders; and �Adherence to the principles and spirit of the ASEAN-China DOC.
The sea-related disputes between Vietnam and China (the Paracels and maritime areas outside the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf) shall be settled through friendly talks and negotiations. Vietnam holds the position that disputes relating to other countries (the Spratlys disputes) shall be settled through negotiations with other parties concerned. 159
Conclusion
In this article, the author has addressed both the Vietnamese position on the sovereignty disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys, and the maritime zones in the SCS. The disputes in the SCS have existed for a long time. They have been seriously affecting the economic development of every affected coastal State, regional stability and peace, and the interests of the international community. The settlement of these disputes requires the efforts of all claimants, of the whole region, and of the international community. In summary, the Vietnamese position to the disputes in the SCS is based on the three points: (1) Vietnam' s sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys; (2) adherence to the UNCLOS in the determination and delimitation of the maritime zones of islands; and (3) rejection of the "nine dotted line,"the main obstacle to any settlement of dispute in the SCS by peaceful means. The key elements to resolving this impasse must be based on confidence and trust between parties, and willingness to respect and follow international law. The sovereignty disputes need to be solved directly by the parties involved through peaceful means. Maritime disputes must be dealt with on the basis of compliance with the UNCLOS. Bilateral issues must be resolved on a bilateral basis. On the other hand, multilateral issues must be resolved on a multilateral basis. The latter path is what Vietnam has chosen.
